Refugee Roulette: Disparities in U.S. Asylum Decisions - Refugee & Law Series (2)

Introduction

In theory, the U.S. asylum process follows a uniform legal standard: a well-founded fear of persecution. In practice, however, the outcome of an asylum claim can depend as much on the assigned judge or officer as on the case itself. This discrepancy issue, often referred to as "refugee roulette," highlights major inconsistencies in the U.S. asylum cases. Such subjective variations between immigration courts, along with the influence of local politics and judges' backgrounds, raise important questions about fairness and the rule of law in a system that claims to offer humanitarian protection.

This article examines the extent and causes of these disparities and discusses potential reforms to enhance consistency and fairness in asylum decisions.

Unequal Justice: Statistical Disparities

A 2007 study by scholars at Georgetown and Temple University coined the term "refugee roulette" to describe the enormous variation in asylum grant rates among judges in the same court and between courts across the country. Their research found that one New York immigration judge granted asylum in only 10% of cases, while another granted 68%—even though they were evaluating cases under the same law (Ramji-Nogales et al., 2007).

More recent data reinforces these concerns. According to TRAC (Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse) at Syracuse University, as of August 2025:

• Immigration courts in San Francisco had an asylum grant rate of 68.78%, compared to 12.9% in Houston.

  
  

• The national average grant rate was approximately 45.67%, with wide variation across regions, judges, and applicant nationalities.

  
  

• Some judges denied over 90% of all claims, while others granted asylum to more than half of their applicants.

The strength of the cases or applicant backgrounds does not always explain such differences. Instead, they often reflect institutional culture, political climate, and personal ideology.

Influencing Factors Behind Disparities

1. Judge Discretion and Background. The Department of Justice appoints immigration judges (IJs) and does not enjoy the independence of federal judges. Their professional backgrounds vary widely—some are former prosecutors, while others are former immigration attorneys —and this can influence their outlook on claims. Judges may also interpret complex asylum standards (such as "particular social group" or "credible fear") differently, depending on their training and ideology.

2. Court Location and Political Context. The location of a court—often shaped by local politics—can significantly impact how asylum cases are decided. For example, courts in more progressive states, such as California and New York, tend to approve asylum applications at higher rates than those in more conservative states, like Texas and Georgia. This regional variation likely reflects differing local attitudes toward immigration, as well as disparities in access to legal support for asylum seekers.

3. Legal Representation. Asylum seekers with legal representation by attorneys have five times more chance of winning their claims. However, many applicants, especially those who are detained or newly arrived, lack access to a lawyer. This significantly widens the gap in outcomes. In some areas, more than 80% of asylum seekers go through the process without a lawyer.

4. Detention Status Detained asylum seekers face lower grant rates, shorter preparation time, and logistical obstacles in gathering evidence. Courts hearing detained cases—often located in remote areas near detention centers—are associated with consistently lower approval rates.

5. Case Load. Immigration judges face crushing dockets. Some preside over 1,000 cases per year, limiting the time available to assess each application thoroughly. Fatigue and institutional pressure to clear backlogs may affect decision-making, contributing to less nuanced or harsher judgments.

Consequences of Inconsistency

These disparities have profound consequences. They mean that two asylum seekers with nearly identical claims—same country, same circumstances—can receive diametrically opposite decisions depending on geography or judge assignment. This undermines trust in the system, violates norms of legal equality, and may result in wrongful deportations to danger.

Perceptions of randomness or bias also erode public confidence in immigration courts, providing ammunition for political actors on both sides—those who claim the system is too lenient and those who claim it is unjustly harsh.

Calls for Reform

Legal scholars and advocates have proposed some solutions to improve these disparities:

• Establish an Independent Immigration Court System: Shift immigration courts out of the Department of Justice into an Article I independent judiciary, ensuring greater impartiality.

  
  

• Enhanced Training and Guidelines: Standardized education for judges and asylum officers, with better-defined criteria for evaluating fear-based claims.

  
  

• Universal Legal Representation: Public funding for legal counsel in asylum proceedings, especially for vulnerable groups such as children, detainees, and those with trauma.

  
  

• Increased Oversight and Transparency: Public data on grant rates and outcomes, and greater scrutiny of outlier judges with extreme denial or approval rates.

  
  

• Case Assignment Reforms: Randomized judge assignments and procedures to reduce forum shopping or ideological clustering.

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Conclusion

The right to seek asylum should not depend on the luck of the draw. Yet, the current U.S. system allows for strikingly different outcomes for similarly situated individuals. While the law sets a clear standard for protection, its application often reflects human variability, institutional shortcomings, and political pressures. Reducing these disparities is not only a legal necessity, but also a moral one. Ensuring consistency, fairness, and due process is vital if the United States is to live up to its commitments to protect the persecuted.

Bibliography

Ramji-Nogales, Jaya, Andrew Schoenholtz, and Philip G. Schrag. Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication. Stanford Law Review, Vol. 60, No. 2 (2007), pp. 295–412. https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2010/04/RefugeeRoulette.pdf

Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC). "Asylum Decisions." Syracuse University. As of August 2025. https://tracreports.org/phptools/immigration/asylum/

American Immigration Council. "Access to Counsel in Immigration Court." September 2016. https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/access-counsel-immigration-court

54 Organizations Sign On in Support of Independent Immigration Court published in National Association of Immigration Judges. https://www.naij-usa.org/images/uploads/publications/54_Organizations_Sign_On_in_Support_of_Independent_Immigration_Court.pdf

EOIR. "Statistics Yearbook 2024." Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Department of Justice. Accessed July 2024. https://ohss.dhs.gov/topics/immigration/yearbook/2024